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I. Introduction 
 
The May 2016 leak of draft texts produced within the context of the on-going Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations has provided an interesting insight into the 
positions of the EU and US with regard to different dimensions of regulatory cooperation, with 
some chapters being complete or near completion (as other articles in this mini-symposium 
discuss), and others still in a more rudimentary format.  One such field of regulation, covered 
in the leaked ‘Tactical State of Play’ document, covers geographical indicators (hereafter GIs).  
However, this coverage is very brief, stating that ‘discussions focused on the preparation of an 
intersessional discussion prior to the next round’2.  GIs, marks identifying the geographical 
origin, and by extension (so the argument goes) quality of goods, have continued to be a 
source of consternation in international trade regulation, with states unable to see eye-to-eye 
on how they should be protected, if at all.  The EU and US in particular reflect two very 
different philosophical approaches to the concept of a GI, and its application to foods in 
particular3.  For the EU, cheeses such as Feta are culturally and geographically distinct, 
attributable to a certain region within Greece4, with a long, established history.  For the US, 
feta is a generic type of ‘white’ cheese, and not deserving of special recognition.  As this paper 
will demonstrate, the substantially different conceptions of GIs, combined with two distinct 
regulatory approaches being exported through other trade agreements by both the EU and US, 
appear to render the negotiating positions of the two regions incompatible.  The impact of this 
                                                        
1 Assistant Professor, University of Warwick, contactable at b.farrand@warwick.ac.uk.  The author would like to 
thank the reviewers for their helpful comments and advice in redrafting this article. 
2 Greenpeace Netherlands TTIP Leak, ‘Note - Tactical State of Play of the TTIP Negotiations’ (2016) at p.21. 
3 It must be stated that there are specific additional regimes for the protection of wines and spirits – in the 
interests of brevity, and to focus on this core issue of controversy, these additional regimes are not considered 
here. 
4 Feta being the name for a traditional cheese produced in Greece since ‘ancient times’, using either ewe’s milk 
exclusively, or a mixture of ewe and goat milk, as per Regulation No 1829/2002 amending the Annex to 
Regulation (EC) No 1107/96 with regard to the name ‘Feta’ 
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may be that GIs are excluded from the scope of TTIP, or that TTIP may fail to be concluded at 
all. 
 
II. Geographical indications as a source of conflict between the EU and US 
 
A GI is a sui generis form of intellectual property right, concerned with identifying a good as 
originating in a specific country, territory or locality5.  First given specific definition in 
international trade rules under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (hereafter TRIPS), this identification is of relevance ‘where a given quality, 
reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical 
origin’6.  For Blakeney, the novelty of a GI comes in the explicit linkage of the concept of 
geography to that of quality7, the idea that a particular location, soil, climate or type of vine 
will influence the quality of produced agricultural goods, whether they be meats, cheeses or 
grains.  Recognition of a GI, it would therefore follow, relies upon accepting the initial 
presumption that these geographical factors, as well as developed knowledge of techniques of 
preparation and production do indeed influence the quality of those goods.  The idea of 
attaching specific qualities to produce of a particular region is by no means new, with 
examples dating back to Egypt’s Old Kingdom and the Ancient Greek city-states8.  Their 
inclusion within TRIPS as a form of intellectual property right, however, was.  While reference 
to appellations of origin is made in the Paris Convention of 1883, and the Lisbon Agreement of 
1958 does make specific reference to GIs9, it was only with TRIPS in the mid 1990s that the 
concept of a geographical indicator became recognised as a legal right with effective dispute 
settlement10.  Yet when compared to the more considerable harmonisation of patents and 
trademarks, the TRIPS provisions on GIs dictate little substantively, allowing states to choose 
                                                        
5 Bernard O’Connor, ‘The Legal Protection of Geographical Indications’ Intellectual Property Quarterly (2004) 
pp.35 et seqq, at p.35. 
6 TRIPS, Article 22(1) 
7 Michael Blakeney, ‘Geographical Indications: What Do They Indicate?’ 6 WIPO Journal (2014) pp.50 et seqq, at 
p.50. 
8 Vadim Mantrov, EU Law on Indications of Geographical Origin: Theory and Practice (Berlin: Springer 2014) at 
p.32. 
9 Although it must be stated that membership of this agreement is low, limiting upon its international impact, as 
indicated by Justine Pila and Paul Torremans, European Intellectual Property Law (Oxford: OUP 2016) p.469; 
William A Kerr, ‘Enjoying a Good Port with a Clear Conscience: Geographic Indicators, Rent Seeking and 
Development’ in William A Kerr (ed), Conflict, Chaos and Confusion (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 2010) 
p.88. 
10 See Kerr (n 6) p.88. 
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for themselves the specific means of protection under Article 22(2)11.  Described by Ganjee as 
constituting an ‘unstable compromise’12, the minimally harmonised nature of GIs at the 
international level is the result of significant conflicts between states regarding the legitimacy, 
and indeed necessity, of their protection.  Whereas much of the discussion of TRIPS relates to 
the ‘global North-global South’ conflict13, particularly as concerns issues such as access to 
medicines14, the protection of GIs can be conceptualised as a conflict between the ‘Old World’ 
and ‘New World’15.  As Sanders puts it, there ‘is not a single IP right that has so consistently 
led to heated debates in international trade other than GIs’16; this debate can be understood in 
terms of the significant divergences in perception of the role of GIs in international trade, and 
subsequently the ways in which they are protected in the IP system.  In order to demonstrate 
how this may negatively impact upon the likelihood of successful TTIP negotiations, it is 
necessary to consider the competing narratives over GIs in the EU and US.  
 
GI protection has been afforded a key role in the EU’s agricultural policies17, particularly as 
they relate to external market relations with other states and their respective consumer 
bases18.  GIs are perceived to promote the cultural heritage of the EU Member States, linking 
issues of trade to issues of authenticity and traditional knowledge19, as well as serving an 
additional goal of promoting the EU’s agricultural regions economically, penetrating new 
                                                        
11 On this point see Gail E Evans, ‘The Protection of Geographical Indications in the European Union and the 
United States under Sui Generis and Trade Mark Systems: Signs of Harmonization?’ Intellectual Property 
Quarterly (2013) pp.18 et seqq, p.20; Antony Taubman, Hannu Wager and Jayashree Watal (eds), A Handbook on 
the WTO TRIPS Agreement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012) pp.77–78. 
12 Dev Gangjee, Relocating the Law of Geographical Indications (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012) 
p.184. 
13 See for example Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge 
Economy? (Abingdon: Earthscan 2002); Carlos María Correa and Abdulqawi Yusuf (eds), Intellectual Property and 
International Trade: The TRIPs Agreement (Aalphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International 2008). 
14 FM Scherer and Jayashree Watal, ‘Post‐TRIPS Options for Access to Patented Medicines in Developing Nations’ 
5 Journal of International Economic Law (2002) pp.913 et seqq. 
15 Taubman, Wager and Watal (n 8) p.77. 
16 Anselm K Sanders, ‘Geographical Indications of Origin: When GIs Become Commodities, All Gloves Come off’ 46 
International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law (2015) pp.755 et seqq, p.755; see also Meir 
Perez Pugatch, ‘Intellectual Property Policy-Making in the 21st Century’ 3 WIPO Journal (2011) pp.71 et seqq, 
p.72; Tim Josling, ‘The War on Terroir: Geographical Indications as a Transatlantic Trade Conflict’ 57 Journal of 
Agricultural Economics (2006) pp.337 et seqq, pp.339–340. 
17 O’Connor (n 2) p.35; Luisa Menapace and others, ‘Consumers’ Preferences for Geographical Origin Labels: 
Evidence from the Canadian Olive Oil Market’ 38 European Review of Agricultural Economics (2011) pp.193 et 
seqq. 
18 Andreas Dür, ‘Bringing Economic Interests Back into the Study of EU Trade Policy-Making’ 10 The British 
Journal of Politics & International Relations (2008) pp.27 et seqq, p.35. 
19 Tesh W Dagne, ‘Beyond Economic Considerations: (Re)conceptualising Geographical Indications for Protecting 
Traditional Agricultural Products’ 46 International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law (2015) 
pp.682 et seqq, pp.684–685; Matteo Ferrari, ‘The Narratives of Geographical Indications’ 10 International Journal 
of the Law in Context (2014) pp.222 et seqq, p.225. 
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markets for EU produce20.  For the EU, goods protected by a GI constitute a useful ‘value-
added’ regime, with the consumer perceptions of increased quality through originality and 
speciality21 meaning that higher prices can be afforded to such products22.  According to a 
2012 report commissioned by the European Commission, the value of sales of GI-protected 
foodstuffs (excluding wines and spirits) was €15.8 billion with an increase in sale value 
between 2005 and 2010 of 19%23.  Due to their value (and indeed the EU’s prime position to 
maximise the international recognition of foods such as mozzarella di bufala and jamón de 
serón) EU protection afforded to GIs is particularly broad.  The 2012 Quality Schemes 
Regulation24 reflects these perceptions regarding the role of GIs, stating their existence is 
necessary to both raise commercial awareness of these high-quality products, as well as 
achieve rural development policy objectives25.  To gain Protected Geographic Indicator (PGI) 
status, Article 5(2) states that only the one of the production steps for that good26 need take 
place in that geographical area27, allowing for a broad range of products to be afforded 
protection.  While Article 6 specifies that a term that is considered generic cannot receive 
protection, jurisprudence of the Court indicates that this is a comparatively low barrier to 
surmount, with Feta cheese gaining protected status, contrary to arguments that the name 
was considered generic by consumers in the EU, in addition to the fact that the name Feta 
refers to a cutting technique rather than a geographical location28. 
 
Rather than promoting luxury agricultural products, however, critics of the EU GI regime, and 
in particular ‘New World’ producers such as the US and Australia, consider it to be a form of 
market protectionism29, or in the words of one US Commerce Department official, ‘nothing 
                                                        
20 Ferrari (n 16) p.225; O’Connor (n 2) p.36. 
21 For more on this see Menapace and others (n 14). 
22 Arete Research & Consulting in Economics, ‘Study on Assessing the Added Value of PDO/PGI Products’ 
(Commissioned by the European Commission 2013) pp.5–6. 
23 Tanguy Chever and others, ‘Value of Production of Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, Wines, Aromatised 
Wines and Spirits Protected by a Geographical Indication’ (European Commission 2012) p.16. 
24 Regulation No 1151/2012 on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs 
25 Ibid, Article 1 
26 Defined in Article 3(7) as processing, production and packaging 
27 Although for the stronger Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) protection, all three steps must take place 
within that area. 
28 Joined cases C-465/02 and C-466/02 Federal Republic of Germany and Kingdom of Denmark v Commission of 
the European Communities EU:C:2005:636 
29 Kal Raustiala and Stephen R Munzer, ‘The Global Struggle over Geographic Indications’ 18 European Journal of 
International Law (2007) pp.337 et seqq, p.351. 
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less than a subsidy of European agriculture interests through claw back of generic terms’30.  
Furthermore, critics in the US dispute the inherent linking of geography with quality, noting 
that waves of immigration to the US from Europe resulted in the ‘know-how’ of many of these 
traditional foods being transferred and applied in US territory, resulting in the same 
processing and production methods31.  Instead of a broad sui generis regime, the US protects 
GIs generally as a discrete subcategory of its trademark laws32, as certification or collective 
marks under the Lanham Act33.  A certification mark allows for a certain mark to be used 
subject to certain specifications, which can include production methods and places of origin34, 
or even as a trademark where the geographic terms used have acquired distinctiveness 
through consumer identification of those terms with a particular company or producer35.  
Furthermore, the US is stricter than the EU when it comes to determining whether a 
particular product is generic, and so ineligible for trademark, certification or collective mark 
protection36; whereas parmigiano reggiano is a protected GI in the EU, ‘parmesan’ is 
considered a generic in the US, referring to a hard, aged cheese37.  The US considers the EU 
approach to GIs to be unnecessarily broad, arguing that trademark law is sufficient to protect 
these goods, while preventing overreach when considering generic terms38.  US agricultural 
producers in particular are opposed to the EU sui generis system, considering it a potential 
threat to their own business interests39.  The US is particularly concerned that the EU grants 
priority to the sui generis GI over trademarks, preventing the registration of a trademark that 
may conflict with a pre-existing GI40, and being permitted to co-exist with a pre-existing 
trademark in the event that the application for a GI is filed subsequent to a successful, good-
                                                        
30 As quoted in Molly Torsen, ‘Apples and Oranges (and Wine): Why the International Conversation Regarding 
Geographic Indications Is at a Standstill’ 87 Journal of the Patent and Trademark Society (2005) pp.31 et seqq, 
p.52. 
31 Blakeney (n 4) p.52. 
32 Evans (n 8) p.23. 
33 The Lanham (Trademark) Act 15 USC § 1054 
34 Josling (n 13) p.347. 
35 ibid. 
36 Evans (n 8) p.26. 
37 ibid. 
38 Michael Blakeney, ‘Scope of the Intellectual Property Chapter of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement 
(TPPA)’ 21 International Trade Law & Regulation (2015) pp.14 et seqq, p.16; see also Dwijen Rangnekar and 
Sanjay Kumar, ‘Another Look at Basmati: Genericity and the Problems of a Transborder Geographical Indication’ 
13 The Journal of World Intellectual Property (2010) pp.202 et seqq. 
39 Dermot J Hayes, Sergio H Lence and Bruce Babcock, ‘Geographic Indications and Farmer-Owned Brands: Why 
Do the US and EU Disagree?’ 4 EuroChoices (2005) pp.28 et seqq. 
40 Regulation No 1151/2012, Article 14(1) 
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faith trademark registration41.  As well as representing a substantial incompatibility in 
economic interests, the conflict between the EU and US also reflects an incompatibility in the 
philosophical and legal approaches to the protection of GIs42, which may have considerable 
implications for TTIP. 
 
III. International manoeuvring and norm exportation: divergences in the protection of 
geographical indicators in regional trade agreements 
 
The EU and US have been engaged in the formulation of other trade agreements in addition to 
the TTIP negotiations, in which they have sought to implement their respective norms and 
legal approaches to GIs, creating an atmosphere of regulatory competition.  The US has 
recently agreed the final text of the Trans Pacific Partnership, a comprehensive trade 
agreement between the US, Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam.  Chapter 18 of this agreement concerns intellectual 
property rights, including trademarks and GIs.  The position of the US is made clear by the 
chapter summary provided by the Office of the United States Trade Representative, which 
states that the intention of TPP in this regulatory sector is to ‘address the potential for 
inappropriately “overprotecting” GIs in ways that shut out US agricultural and food producers, 
including […how to] determine whether a term is generic in its market’43.  The US preference 
for protection within the context of the trademark system is apparent under Article 18.19, 
which concerns collective and certification marks.  This Article states that each party ‘shall 
also provide that signs that may serve as GIs are capable of protection under its trademark 
system’.  While Article 18.30 states that GIs may also be protected through a sui generis 
system, in comparison to the EU regime, strict limitations are placed upon its operation.  
Article 18.32(1) outlines the grounds of opposition to a grant of a GI, which can take place if it 
would cause confusion with a trademark that is the subject of a pre-existing application or 
registration, it would cause confusion with a pre-existing mark granted, or the GI is a ‘term 
customary in common language as the common name for the relevant good’ in that territory.  
                                                        
41 Ibid, Article 14(2); see also WTO Disputes WT/DS/174 and WT/DS/290 EC - Protection of Trademarks and 
Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs (2005)    
42 See also Cerkia Bramley, Delphine Marie-Vivien and Estelle Biénabe, ‘Considerations in Designing an 
Appropriate Legal Framework for GIs in Southern Countries’ in Cerkia Bramley, Estelle Bienabe and Johann 
Kirsten (eds), Developing Geographical Indications in the South (Berlin: Springer 2013); Stephan Marette, 
Roxanne Clemens and Bruce Babcock, ‘Recent International and Regulatory Decisions about Geographical 
Indications’ 24 Agribusiness (2008) pp.453 et seqq. 
43 Office of the United States Trade Representative, ‘Intellectual Property Chapter Summary’ (2015) p.3. 
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Article 18.32(2) states that these grounds for opposition can also be used as the grounds for 
the cancellation of an existing GI, indicating that the position of the US is that trademarks have 
prime position in the intellectual property regime44.  Calboli has referred to this as a ‘first in 
time, first in right’ approach to registration, in which a new GI cannot be used to supplant a 
pre-existing trademark45 – however, the fact that a GI can be cancelled on the grounds of a 
competing mark suggests this goes beyond ‘first in time, first in right’ to afford trademarks a 
higher standard of protection than GIs.  The approach in TPP mirrors that of the US-South 
Korea Free Trade Agreement, which specifies at Article 18.2(2) that GIs are to be protected as 
trademarks, and that trademark holders can prevent the use by other economic actors of 
‘identical or similar signs, including GIs’ at Article 18.2(4).  It becomes quickly apparent that 
the US position is that GIs should be protected at the international level as a category of 
trademark, rather than under a sui generis system. 
 
The EU, in comparison, is rapidly exporting its norms and laws through its own trade 
agreements.  In the finalised Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) 
negotiated with Canada, the EU has ensured that its definition of GIs as part of a sui generis 
system of protection is reproduced in Article 20.16, including a list of protected EU-based GIs 
in Annex 20-A.  Furthermore, CETA grants priority to the sui generis GIs over trademarks, 
stating in Article 20.19(6) that any trademark applications that contains elements of the 
protected GI shall be refused, and that pre-existing trademarks can be invalidated at the 
request of an interested party.  Interestingly, the list in Annex 20-A includes cheeses that are 
the source of EU-based frustration (to say nothing of US concerns) such as Feta, in addition to 
parmigiano reggiano and mozzarella di bufala.  The EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement 
contains similar terms, albeit allowing for the co-existence of a prior trademark under Article 
10.22, but preventing the registration of a trademark incorporating an element of a GI under 
Article 10.23.  As with CETA, Annex 10-A of the Agreement includes protection for products 
argued by the US to be generic, such as Feta.  According to Engelhardt, DG Agriculture and 
Rural Development considers protection of GIs under a sui generis system in trade 
agreements as a ‘must-have’46, with the EU pursuing (somewhat successfully) a policy of 
                                                        
44 A view supported by Blakeney (n 35) p.16. 
45 Irene Calboli, ‘Geographical Indications of Origin at the Crossroads of Local Development, Consumer 
Protection and Marketing Strategies’ 46 International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 
(2015)  pp.760 et seqq, p.765. 
46 Tim Engelhardt, ‘Geographical Indications under Recent EU Trade Agreements’ 46 International Review of 
Intellectual Property and Competition Law (2015) pp.781 et seqq, p.783. 
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‘securing protection of EU-based GIs through bilateral and regional general trade 
agreements’47.  In the case of South Korea, however, the adoption of two trade agreements 
that present radically different approaches to the issues of GI creates the potential for 
significant regulatory clashes48, as well as demonstrating the seemingly incompatible 
positions of the EU and US. 
 
IV. What does this mean for TTIP? 
 
It is clear that the regulatory approaches taken by the EU and US to GIs in trade agreements 
differ in substance and underlying rationale.  This does not bode well for future negotiations 
on this chapter of TTIP.  The EU has made it clear that it considers GI protection, including of 
some foodstuffs that the US considers generic, as constituting its ‘offensive trade interests’49, 
including in Annex I of its textual proposal products such as Feta and parmigiano.  The EU is 
making its position clear regarding negotiations, and indeed prospects for a successful deal.  
Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development Hogan has stated that unless the US 
gives satisfactory protection for EU GIs, ‘there will be no deal’50, and that there will be no 
sacrifice of GIs ‘for the sake of a deal with the US or anyone else’51.  This causes considerable 
difficulties for the realisation of a successful deal – in response, US negotiators have stated 
that the EU ‘has aspirations for changing the U.S. system that are not going to be met in 
TTIP’52.  These views are supported by those in the US agricultural community, including the 
president of the US National Milk Producers Federation, who stated that the GI issue ‘is a 
horrific overreach by the EU that undermines the entire EU interests in these negotiations […] 
there won’t be a TTIP agreement passed by the Congress that is detrimental to U.S. 
                                                        
47 ibid p.816. 
48 Billy A Melo Araujo, ‘The EU’s Deep Trade Agenda: Stumbling Block or Stepping Stone Towards Multilateral 
Liberalisation?’ in Christoph Herrmann, Markus Krajewski and Jörg Philipp Terhechte (eds), European Yearbook 
of International Economic Law 2014 (Springer: Berlin 2013) p.281. 
49 European Commission, ‘Follow Up to the Strategy for the Protection and Enforcement of IP Rights in Third 
Countries - GIs’ (2015) 2; Alan Matthews, ‘Geographical Indications (GIs) in the US-EU TTIP Negotiations’ 
<http://capreform.eu/geographical-indications-gis-in-the-us-eu-ttip-negotiations/> accessed 19 May 2016. 
50 Hans von der Burchard, ‘POLITICO Pro’s Morning Trade: EU Flexes Muscles on Food Protection in TTIP — 
Wallonians Reject CETA’ (POLITICO, 29 April 2016) <http://www.politico.eu/newsletter/morning-
trade/politico-pros-morning-trade-eu-flexes-muscles-on-food-protection-in-ttip-wallonians-reject-ceta/> 
accessed 19 May 2016. 
51 ibid. 
52 Hans von der Burchard and Emmet Livingtstone, ‘Transatlantic Trade Deal Could Be Bogged down ... by Feta 
Cheese’ (POLITICO, 12 May 2016) <http://www.politico.eu/article/transatlantic-trade-deal-could-be-bogged-
down-by-feta-cheese-ttip-champagne/> accessed 19 May 2016. 
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agriculture’53.  As argued above in the previous section, the incompatibilities between the EU 
and US on this issue are not ‘merely’ economic, but represent two distinct legal and 
philosophical conceptualisations of the role and function of GIs.  Given such divergences, GIs 
may end up excluded from the scope of TTIP, or potentially result in its abandonment.  Given 
the desire for regulatory harmony as a facilitator of increased trade between the two regions, 
neither result is particularly auspicious.   
 
And, to conclude, what was one of the key products causing such consternation?  Feta cheese.  
                                                        
53 ibid. 
